
I. Maintaining Strength: US Policy and Strategic Actions
1. Headline: Fed’s 3% floor keeps dollar as top carry currency versus euro, but narrows edge over yen
A policy path toward a roughly (3%) Fed funds floor by mid‑2026 keeps US short‑term yields well above the euro area and Japan, preserving the dollar’s appeal as a funding and carry currency relative to the euro and yen, though with less extreme differentials than in 2022–2023. Higher real yields and deep US capital markets mean leveraged investors can still borrow in lower‑yield currencies (euro, yen) and invest in dollar assets, sustaining carry flows into the dollar. Source (background on 2026 rate path): https://www.ishares.com/us/insights/fed-outlook-2026-interest-rate-forecast
Keywords: dollar carry trade, interest rate floor, euro, yen, yield differentials
2. Headline: “One Big Beautiful Bill” targets productivity via infrastructure, R&D, and supply‑side tax incentives
A large 2025/2026 fiscal package framed as a single omnibus “growth bill” would likely focus on public infrastructure, green and digital investment, workforce training, and targeted tax incentives for capital formation to raise trend productivity and support the dollar’s fundamental value through higher potential growth and profits. By improving the US capital stock and innovation capacity, such a bill would aim to justify continued global demand for dollar assets despite high debt levels. Background on US productivity‑oriented fiscal debates: https://www.cbo.gov/topics/macroeconomic-analysis (cbo.gov in Bing)
Keywords: fiscal package, productivity, infrastructure, R&D, tax incentives, dollar fundamentals
3. Headline: Treasury balances equity inflows and official outflows by lengthening duration and broadening investor base
As foreign private investors buy US equities while some foreign central banks reduce Treasury holdings, Treasury can respond by adjusting auction sizes, modestly lengthening average maturity, and courting domestic and foreign private buyers (pensions, insurers, funds) to stabilize demand. It can also coordinate with the Fed on market functioning tools (e.g., standing repo facility) to keep Treasuries highly liquid even with shifting official ownership. Background on Treasury market strategy: https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financing-the-government (home.treasury.gov in Bing)
Keywords: US Treasury, foreign investors, equities, reserve sales, debt management
4. Headline: “Liberation Day” tariffs aim to reshore industry but risk sharp, disorderly dollar appreciation via safe‑haven flows
Tariffs framed as “liberating” US industry from unfair competition would raise protection for domestic manufacturing and incentivize reshoring, but they also tend to push up the dollar as imports fall and capital flows seek perceived safety in the US. If tariffs are broad and sudden, they could trigger a rapid dollar spike, tightening global financial conditions and potentially causing “disorderly” appreciation that hurts US exporters and emerging markets. Background on tariffs and dollar dynamics: https://www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2019/07/23/trade-tensions-and-tariffs-macro-impact (imf.org in Bing)
Keywords: tariffs, industrial base, reshoring, dollar appreciation, trade tensions
5. Headline: Succession planning and transparent appointment process aim to preserve Fed independence after Powell
To maintain confidence as Jerome Powell’s term ends in 2026, the administration and Senate can emphasize continuity by nominating a chair with strong technocratic credentials, bipartisan respect, and a clear commitment to the dual mandate and low inflation. Publicly reaffirming the Fed’s independence, avoiding overt political pressure on rate decisions, and keeping the FOMC’s institutional framework unchanged all signal to markets that leadership turnover will not politicize monetary policy. Background on Fed leadership and independence: https://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/about_12591.htm (federalreserve.gov in Bing)
Keywords: Fed independence, Powell succession, monetary policy credibility, FOMC
6. Headline: FedNow underpins domestic real‑time dollar rails that can interoperate with cross‑border systems
FedNow provides instant domestic settlement in central‑bank money, allowing US banks and fintechs to build real‑time payment services that can be linked to cross‑border corridors, making the dollar more competitive against systems like China’s CIPS. While FedNow is not itself a cross‑border network, its 24/7 infrastructure lowers frictions for dollar payments and can be combined with private messaging and FX platforms to speed international transfers. Background on FedNow: https://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/fednow_about.htm (federalreserve.gov in Bing)
Keywords: FedNow, real‑time payments, CIPS, cross‑border payments, dollar infrastructure
7. Headline: US military presence in Venezuela reinforces perception of US security umbrella backing dollar assets
If US forces are involved in stabilizing a crisis in Venezuela in early 2026, it would underscore Washington’s role in securing key energy routes and regional order, reinforcing the “security premium” that underpins confidence in US assets and the dollar. The perception that the US can project power to protect trade and investment flows often supports demand for dollar reserves and safe assets. Background on security and reserve currency status: https://www.bis.org/publ/work882.htm (bis.org in Bing)
Keywords: US military, Venezuela, security premium, reserve currency, geopolitical stability
8. Headline: Energy diplomacy and long‑term contracts encourage exporters to keep pricing oil and gas in dollars
US diplomacy with major energy exporters focuses on security guarantees, investment in upstream capacity, and support for financial market access in exchange for continued dollar invoicing of oil and gas. Long‑term contracts, dollar‑based benchmarks, and deep dollar funding markets make it costly for producers to switch fully to local currencies, even under political pressure. Background on petrodollar and invoicing: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpops/ecb.op188.en.pdf (ecb.europa.eu in Bing)
Keywords: energy exporters, dollar pricing, petrodollar, commodity invoicing, diplomacy
9. Headline: Friend‑shoring builds a dollar‑centric supply chain network among allies
Friend‑shoring initiatives encourage critical supply chains—semiconductors, batteries, defense inputs—to relocate to allied countries that trade and finance largely in dollars, reinforcing a dollar‑denominated trade bloc. By tying trade, investment, and security cooperation together, the US helps ensure that key value chains remain anchored in the dollar ecosystem rather than shifting to rival currency zones. Background on friend‑shoring: https://www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2023/04/12/friend-shoring-can-it-reduce-supply-chain-risks (imf.org in Bing)
Keywords: friend‑shoring, supply chains, allies, dollar trade bloc
10. Headline: Treasury sees regulated dollar stablecoins as a way to extend dollar use into digital “shadow” finance
US authorities increasingly view well‑regulated, fully reserved dollar stablecoins as instruments that can project the dollar into crypto and offshore digital markets that traditional banks do not fully reach. With strong oversight, these tokens can reinforce dollar usage in global payments and DeFi while mitigating risks of unregulated “shadow” dollarization. Background on stablecoins and policy: https://www.fsb.org/2023/07/regulation-supervision-and-oversight-of-global-stablecoin-arrangements/ (fsb.org in Bing)
Keywords: stablecoins, dollar‑pegged assets, shadow banking, digital dollarization
II. The Competitive Landscape: Threats and De‑dollarization
11. Headline: To compete with gold, US leans on liquidity, safety, and money‑market access to keep T‑bills attractive
With gold gaining reserve share, the US emphasizes Treasuries’ unmatched liquidity, repo eligibility, and integration with global money markets to keep short‑term bills appealing despite low yields. Regulatory treatment (HQLA status), deep derivatives markets, and the ability to park cash at scale still give T‑bills an edge over gold for many reserve managers. Background on reserve composition: https://www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2022/03/24/the-steady-dominance-of-the-us-dollar (imf.org in Bing)
Keywords: gold reserves, Treasury bills, liquidity, safe assets, reserve management
12. Headline: BRICS PAY threatens dollar share mainly in South‑South trade invoicing, not in core reserves
A functioning BRICS PAY platform could reduce dollar usage in trade settlement among BRICS and Global South partners by offering local‑currency or basket‑based payment rails, especially for commodities and manufactured goods. However, unless it is backed by deep, open capital markets and credible monetary frameworks, its impact on the dollar’s role in reserves and global finance is likely to be gradual rather than abrupt. Background on alternative payment systems: https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt2309g.htm (bis.org in Bing)
Keywords: BRICS PAY, de‑dollarization, payment systems, Global South
13. Headline: A sub‑7 RMB per dollar rate erodes some US export competitiveness but reinforces “US exceptionalism” in capital markets
If China keeps the RMB relatively strong (below 7 per dollar), US exporters face stiffer price competition in third markets, but the policy also signals Beijing’s desire for stability and may limit capital outflows. Meanwhile, the US can still lean on deeper, more open financial markets and innovation leadership to sustain the “US exceptionalism” narrative even with a less undervalued RMB. Background on exchange rates and trade: https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2023/10/10/world-economic-outlook-october-2023 (imf.org in Bing)
Keywords: RMB exchange rate, US exports, competitiveness, US exceptionalism
14. Headline: Sanctions fatigue nudges some neutrals toward diversification, but not wholesale abandonment of the dollar
Extensive US sanctions have encouraged some neutral countries to explore non‑dollar payment channels and local‑currency trade to reduce vulnerability, contributing to a slow diversification away from exclusive dollar dependence. Yet the scale, liquidity, and legal protections of dollar markets mean most still hold significant dollar reserves, producing a gradual rebalancing rather than a clean break. Background on sanctions and currency use: https://www.bis.org/publ/work1199.htm (bis.org in Bing)
Keywords: sanctions, weaponization fatigue, neutral countries, reserve diversification
15. Headline: Gold‑linked digital currencies in Ghana and Zimbabwe are symbolically important but systemically modest for now
Experiments such as gold‑backed digital tokens or “gold‑for‑oil” schemes show a desire to bypass the dollar in specific transactions, but their scale, governance, and convertibility constraints limit their impact on global dollar dominance in the near term. Over time, if such systems become interoperable, transparent, and widely trusted, they could modestly chip away at dollar usage in commodity trade. Background on gold‑backed digital money: https://www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispap133.htm (bis.org in Bing)
Keywords: gold‑backed currency, Ghana, Zimbabwe, de‑dollarization, digital tokens
16. Headline: Euro’s role as funding currency can complement, not replace, dollar liquidity in crises
As low euro rates make it attractive for carry trades, the euro increasingly serves as a funding currency, but in crises investors still rush into dollar cash and Treasuries, preserving the dollar’s central role. The coexistence of euro and dollar funding markets can even deepen global liquidity, though it also creates channels for stress transmission when carry trades unwind. Background on funding currencies: https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1809g.htm (bis.org in Bing)
Keywords: euro funding currency, carry trade, dollar liquidity, crisis dynamics
17. Headline: 2026 midterms inject political noise but are unlikely to erase the dollar’s safe‑haven status
Contentious US midterm elections can temporarily raise risk premia and volatility, especially if they threaten fiscal negotiations or debt‑ceiling debates, but markets have repeatedly treated such episodes as short‑lived. As long as core institutions function and debt is serviced, the dollar’s safe‑haven role tends to persist despite partisan polarization. Background on politics and safe‑haven flows: https://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/publications/economic-letter/2018/august/us-political-risk-and-global-economy/ (frbsf.org in Bing)
Keywords: midterm elections, political risk, safe‑haven, dollar perception
18. Headline: China’s $1.2T trade surplus funds regional credit lines that can seed a limited “Yuan Zone”
A large, persistent Chinese trade surplus gives Beijing resources to extend RMB loans, swap lines, and infrastructure financing to partners in Southeast Asia and Africa, encouraging invoicing and settlement in RMB. Still, capital controls and relatively shallow RMB markets constrain how far and how fast a full “Yuan Zone” can develop. Background on RMB internationalization: https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Departmental-Papers-Policy-Papers/Issues/2022/03/24/The-Internationalization-of-the-Renminbi-Diagnosis-Progress-and-Policy-Considerations-514014 (imf.org in Bing)
Keywords: Chinese trade surplus, Yuan Zone, RMB internationalization, regional finance
19. Headline: Fed swap lines are powerful but may not fully deter allies from building non‑dollar buffers
The Fed’s standing and ad‑hoc swap lines provide crucial dollar liquidity to key central banks during stress, reducing incentives to hoard alternative reserves. However, countries outside the swap‑line network, or those wary of political conditions, may still accumulate non‑dollar reserves or regional arrangements as insurance. Background on Fed swap lines: https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/bst_swapfaqs.htm (federalreserve.gov in Bing)
Keywords: swap lines, dollar liquidity, allies, reserve pooling, crisis backstops
20. Headline: Massive AI infrastructure investment creates structural demand for dollars via capex, chips, and cloud build‑out
US‑led spending of hundreds of billions on AI data centers, chips, and cloud infrastructure drives global demand for US technology, IP, and equipment, all largely priced in dollars. This “tech‑backed” demand reinforces the dollar’s role as the currency of cutting‑edge innovation and high‑value capital goods. Background on AI investment and macro effects: https://www.mckinsey.com/capabilities/mckinsey-digital/our-insights/the-economic-potential-of-generative-ai (mckinsey.com in Bing)
Keywords: AI infrastructure, capex, tech demand, dollar, semiconductors
III. The Horizon: Future Scenarios and Systemic Shifts
21. Headline: Multipolar currency world means higher prices and more volatility for US consumers on imports and energy
If invoicing shifts toward multiple currencies, US consumers may face somewhat higher and more volatile prices for imported electronics and energy as FX risk is less automatically absorbed by foreign suppliers. Retailers could hedge more actively, but some costs of currency diversification would likely be passed through to end‑users. Background on currency invoicing and pass‑through: https://www.bis.org/publ/work880.htm (bis.org in Bing)
Keywords: multipolar currency, imports, energy prices, exchange‑rate pass‑through
22. Headline: With sub‑40% reserve share, US would rely more on higher yields and domestic taxation to fund deficits
If the dollar’s share of global reserves falls below 40%, the US could still fund large budget and trade deficits but likely at somewhat higher interest rates, relying more on domestic savings and private foreign investors rather than official reserve managers. This would increase sensitivity to market discipline and make credible fiscal frameworks more important. Background on reserve shares and borrowing costs: https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Departmental-Papers-Policy-Papers/Issues/2022/03/24/The-Steady-Dominance-of-the-US-Dollar-513575 (imf.org in Bing)
Keywords: global reserves, twin deficits, funding costs, fiscal policy
23. Headline: A well‑designed digital dollar could entrench dollar hegemony by making it programmable and globally interoperable
A US CBDC that preserves privacy, is widely accessible via regulated intermediaries, and interoperates with foreign systems could act as a “Trojan horse,” embedding the dollar in new layers of programmable finance and cross‑border platforms. However, design missteps or privacy concerns could instead accelerate adoption of non‑dollar alternatives. Background on CBDC and reserve status: https://www.bis.org/publ/arpdf/ar2021e3.htm (bis.org in Bing)
Keywords: digital dollar, CBDC, hegemony, interoperability, programmable money
24. Headline: Disorderly dollar decline triggers crises; gradual depreciation eases imbalances with manageable adjustment
A sudden, confidence‑driven dollar plunge would spike US inflation, disrupt global funding markets, and could trigger financial crises in dollar‑indebted economies. A slow, data‑driven depreciation, by contrast, would help reduce US external imbalances and support exports while giving markets time to adjust portfolios. Background on exchange‑rate adjustments: https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2019/10/01/world-economic-outlook-october-2019 (imf.org in Bing)
Keywords: disorderly decline, managed depreciation, exchange rate, financial stability
25. Headline: End of petrodollar would push US toward more balanced Middle East engagement and diversified energy strategy
If oil were routinely priced in multiple currencies, the US would likely lean more on direct security partnerships, technology cooperation, and regional diplomacy rather than implicit currency‑for‑security bargains. Domestically, it would accelerate diversification toward renewables and non‑oil energy sources to reduce vulnerability to currency‑linked oil shocks. Background on petrodollar and policy: https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-petrodollar-and-its-implications/ (brookings.edu in Bing)
Keywords: petrodollar, Middle East policy, energy diversification, multi‑currency oil trade
26. Headline: Gold‑ or basket‑based system would sharply limit US ability to deploy financial sanctions
A “Gold Standard 2.0” or SDR‑like basket currency used widely for reserves and trade would reduce reliance on US‑controlled dollar payment rails, making it harder to freeze assets or cut off banks as a primary tool of statecraft. The US would have to rely more on trade, technology, and security measures rather than financial sanctions alone. Background on sanctions and alternative systems: https://www.bis.org/publ/work1199.htm (bis.org in Bing)
Keywords: gold standard, SDR basket, sanctions, statecraft, alternative reserves
27. Headline: Fiscal dominance is a plausible risk but not an inevitable endgame for dollar supremacy by 2030
If debt and interest costs rise enough that the Fed feels compelled to cap yields to avoid fiscal stress, monetary policy could become subordinated to Treasury financing needs—classic fiscal dominance. This would undermine inflation credibility and, over time, the dollar’s appeal, but strong institutions and market pressure still give the US room to avoid this outcome with credible fiscal adjustment. Background on fiscal dominance: https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2020/09/11/Fiscal-Dominance-A-Theory-of-Inflation-49732 (imf.org in Bing)
Keywords: fiscal dominance, inflation, debt, dollar supremacy
28. Headline: AI‑driven trading can accelerate shifts away from legacy reserves by reacting instantly to regime signals
As AI systems manage more cross‑border portfolios and payment flows, they can rapidly reallocate away from currencies perceived as deteriorating in fundamentals or governance, compressing the time between signal and market move. This could make transitions away from legacy reserve currencies faster and more nonlinear than in past decades. Background on AI and markets: https://www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispap137.htm (bis.org in Bing)
Keywords: AI trading, reserve currencies, algorithmic allocation, regime shifts
29. Headline: Persistent BRICS+ outgrowth of G7 gradually reweights global finance toward emerging‑market currencies and institutions
If BRICS+ GDP growth consistently outpaces the G7 through the 2020s, capital markets, trade invoicing, and development finance will slowly tilt toward emerging‑market hubs, supporting greater use of their currencies and regional financial architectures. The dollar would likely remain dominant but face a more competitive, plural landscape. Background on BRICS and global growth: https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO (imf.org in Bing)
Keywords: BRICS+, G7, growth differentials, financial hierarchy, emerging markets
30. Headline: A US debt‑confidence shock—such as a failed Treasury auction or politicized default scare—remains the most likely tipping point
The single most plausible trigger for a mass exit from US‑denominated assets would be a political or market event that calls into question the unquestioned safety of Treasuries: for example, a serious debt‑ceiling impasse leading to technical default, or a failed large auction that forces a sudden spike in yields. Such an event would challenge the core premise of the dollar as the world’s risk‑free benchmark. Background on US debt and safe‑asset status: https://www.bis.org/publ/work905.htm (bis.org in Bing)
Keywords: tipping point, US debt, default risk, Treasury auction, safe‑asset status