I. Roots of the Somali conflict
1. Colonial partition made “Greater Somalia” irredentism almost inevitable
European and Ethiopian partition left Somali-inhabited lands split between British Somaliland, Italian Somaliland, French Somaliland (Djibouti), Ethiopia (Ogaden), and Kenya (NFD), turning a culturally cohesive people into citizens of five different states and hardwiring grievance into the post‑colonial order. CJA – Center for Justice & Accountability This fed the ideology of “Greater Somalia,” which became a central project of the independent Somali Republic and underpinned later conflicts with Ethiopia and Kenya over Somali-populated regions. CJA – Center for Justice & Accountability The imposed borders also overlaid and disrupted clan territories, making later interstate disputes inseparable from intra‑Somali clan politics. CJA – Center for Justice & Accountability
Source: Somalia: Colonial Legacy – CJA CJA – Center for Justice & Accountability
Keywords: colonial partition, Greater Somalia, irredentism, Ogaden, NFD, post‑colonial borders
2. Cold War rivalry militarized Siad Barre’s Somalia and deepened its war-making capacity
During the Cold War, Somalia first aligned with the Soviet Union, receiving extensive arms and training, then shifted to the United States after the Ogaden War, which meant a second wave of militarization rather than demobilization. Britannica Academia.edu This external backing allowed Barre to build one of Africa’s most heavily armed states relative to its size, enabling both external adventurism and internal repression. After the Ogaden defeat, the regime increasingly used its security apparatus against domestic opponents, entrenching a war-based political economy that later fueled civil war. Britannica Academia.edu
Source: Somalia – Civil war, conflict, famine | Britannica Britannica
Keywords: Cold War, militarization, Siad Barre, Soviet support, U.S. alliance, security apparatus
3. “Scientific Socialism” tried to erase clans from above but ended by re‑weaponizing them
Barre’s “Scientific Socialism” formally banned clanism, promoted a national script and literacy campaigns, and criminalized public reference to clan, aiming to replace lineage with a unified Somali national identity. CJA – Center for Justice & Accountability In practice, the regime redistributed power and resources along new, covert clan lines, favoring Barre’s own network while insisting that clan no longer mattered. As repression and economic hardship grew, people fell back on clan for protection, and the regime’s hypocrisy turned “anti‑clan” socialism into a trigger for even more clan‑based mobilization once state authority weakened. Britannica Academia.edu
Source: Somalia: Colonial Legacy – CJA CJA – Center for Justice & Accountability
Keywords: Scientific Socialism, clan system, social engineering, nationalism, identity politics, authoritarianism
4. The 1977–78 Ogaden War shattered Somalia’s power, legitimacy, and alliances
The Ogaden War began as the high point of Greater Somalia ambitions but ended in a decisive Ethiopian–Cuban–Soviet-backed defeat that broke the aura of regime competence. Britannica Academia.edu Military losses, refugee flows, and economic strain undermined Barre’s legitimacy and fractured his alliance with the Soviet Union, pushing him into a more desperate U.S.-backed posture. Britannica Academia.edu The post‑war coup attempt in 1978 and the creation of oppositional movements like the SSDF and later the SNM were direct outgrowths of the war’s failure, marking the beginning of the regime’s terminal decline. Academia.edu hornreview.org
Source: The Somalia Civil-War from 1988–1991 – Academia.edu Academia.edu
Keywords: Ogaden War, Ethiopia, defeat, Soviet alliance, SSDF, regime decline
5. The shift from democracy to military rule hollowed out the long-term legitimacy of the center
The 1960–69 civilian parliamentary era, though corrupt and unstable, retained some pluralist legitimacy and space for opposition, which anchored trust—however thin—in electoral politics. The 1969 coup replaced this with a security‑centric, one‑party military system that concentrated power in Barre and sidelined parties, parliament, and independent courts. Britannica When that personalist regime later collapsed, there were no legitimate central institutions left to inherit authority, so power defaulted to militias, warlords, and clan elders rather than any national state framework. Britannica Academia.edu
Source: Somalia – Civil war, conflict, famine | Britannica Britannica
Keywords: parliamentary democracy, military coup, authoritarianism, institutional decay, political legitimacy
6. The 1991 state collapse reflected both deep clan grievances and structural economic breakdown
Decades of economic mismanagement—failed state-led projects, war costs, debt, and shrinking public services—eroded the regime’s ability to co‑opt or pay its security forces. Britannica Academia.edu Simultaneously, state violence targeted particular clans (especially in the north), creating collective memories of atrocity that gave rebel movements strong social bases. Academia.edu hornreview.org When the economy could no longer sustain patronage and repression, those accumulated grievances turned into open rebellion; the collapse was thus an interaction: a broke regime that could no longer buy loyalty confronting armed, clan‑rooted oppositions determined to dismantle it. Britannica Academia.edu
Source: The Somalia Civil-War from 1988–1991 – Academia.edu Academia.edu
Keywords: state collapse, clan grievances, economic mismanagement, patronage, rebellion, 1991
7. The “M.O.D.” alliance sustained Barre’s rule but narrowed his base and hastened isolation
As opposition grew, Barre increasingly relied on an informal inner core drawn largely from the Mareehaan, Ogaden, and Dhulbahante (“M.O.D.”) clans, turning the regime into what many perceived as a factional project rather than a national government. This concentration of power and protection deepened resentment among excluded clans and made the regime’s survival dependent on a shrinking coalition of security elites. Once parts of that alliance fractured and elements of these clans defected or were militarily pressured, the regime lost its last serious domestic pillars and collapsed rapidly.
Source: Somalia’s Fractured Legacy: False Prophets and Failed Revolutions – Horn Review hornreview.org
Keywords: M.O.D. alliance, Mareehaan, Ogaden, Dhulbahante, coalition politics, regime survival
8. Environmental scarcity has long turned pastoral competition into armed inter‑clan conflict
Somali pastoralism depends on highly variable rainfall and fragile grazing lands, which historically pushed clans and lineages to compete over wells, river access, and dry‑season pastures. CJA – Center for Justice & Accountability In years of drought or ecological stress, everyday disputes over water or grazing could escalate into violent raids, revenge cycles, and shifting alliances, especially when weapons were plentiful. The colonial and post‑colonial states often failed to mediate these disputes fairly, so environmental stress repeatedly translated into politicized clan warfare rather than managed resource sharing. CJA – Center for Justice & Accountability
Source: Somalia: Colonial Legacy – CJA CJA – Center for Justice & Accountability
Keywords: environmental scarcity, pastoralism, drought, resource conflict, inter‑clan warfare
9. Rebel movements failed to unify in 1991 because their visions, clan bases, and external backers diverged
The SNM, USC, and SSDF emerged from different regions and clan constituencies—Isaaq in the north, Hawiye in Mogadishu, Majeerteen and others in the northeast—with distinct war experiences and political projects. Wikipedia Academia.edu hornreview.org Rather than a shared program for a new state, they primarily aligned around removing Barre, after which rival leaders and factions vied for control of Mogadishu and key regions. Wikipedia hornreview.org External patrons (especially Ethiopia’s role in different fronts) and mistrust over power‑sharing further blocked the creation of a unified provisional government, turning victory over Barre into the opening of a multi‑sided civil war instead. Academia.edu hornreview.org
Source: United Somali Congress – Wikipedia Wikipedia
Keywords: SNM, USC, SSDF, factionalism, clan bases, post‑Barre power struggle
10. Italian and British colonial legacies produced divergent northern and southern political cultures
British rule in the north tended to be lighter and more indirect, working through clan elders and customary institutions, which later facilitated relatively consensual local conferences that underpinned Somaliland’s post‑1991 settlement. CJA – Center for Justice & Accountability Italian rule in the south was more centralized and interventionist, building plantation economies, strong governors, and urban patronage networks, leaving a legacy of expectation that power and resources flow from a dominant central state. CJA – Center for Justice & Accountability These contrasting administrative traditions helped shape why the north developed a relatively coherent, negotiated order after 1991 while the south descended into prolonged competition over control of the capital and the central state.
Source: Somalia: Colonial Legacy – CJA CJA – Center for Justice & Accountability
Keywords: British Somaliland, Italian Somaliland, indirect rule, centralization, political culture, Somaliland
II. Key actors in the conflict
11. Al‑Shabaab evolved from nationalist insurgency to regional jihadist franchise
Al‑Shabaab initially framed its struggle as resistance to foreign intervention and corrupt Somali elites, embedding itself in local grievances and nationalist rhetoric. Over time, its leadership pledged allegiance to Al‑Qaeda, adopted a more global jihadist narrative, and expanded operations and recruitment beyond Somalia’s borders. The group now combines localized shadow governance, extortion, and terror tactics with attacks and plots targeting regional states, positioning itself as both a Somali insurgent actor and part of a wider transnational jihadist movement.
Source: Somalia – Civil war, conflict, famine | Britannica Britannica
Keywords: Al‑Shabaab, nationalism, jihadism, Al‑Qaeda, insurgency, terrorism
12. The Federal Government constantly bargains authority with powerful Federal Member States
The FGS is internationally recognized, controls key institutions in Mogadishu, and represents Somalia abroad, but its effective power over territory depends heavily on deals with Federal Member States such as Puntland and Jubaland. These states command local security forces, manage ports or border economies, and often negotiate their participation in national processes (elections, constitutional reform, revenue sharing) from a position of leverage rather than subordination. The result is a fluid, transactional federalism where authority is continuously renegotiated rather than clearly hierarchical.
Source: Somalia – Civil war, conflict, famine | Britannica Britannica
Keywords: Federal Government of Somalia, federalism, Puntland, Jubaland, power‑sharing, territorial control
13. AMISOM/ATMIS reshaped the security map, but withdrawal risks exposing fragile gains
AMISOM (and its successor ATMIS) pushed Al‑Shabaab out of much of Mogadishu and several major towns, enabling the FGS and Federal Member States to establish at least nominal administrations in those areas. Britannica Yet many “liberated” territories remain dependent on African Union troops and external logistics, with limited local security capacity and persistent Al‑Shabaab influence in surrounding rural zones. A rapid or poorly sequenced withdrawal risks creating security vacuums, allowing Al‑Shabaab to re‑enter towns, intimidate local leaders, and showcase the state’s inability to stand alone.
Source: Somalia – Civil war, conflict, famine | Britannica Britannica
Keywords: AMISOM, ATMIS, peacekeeping, withdrawal, security vacuums, territorial control
14. Somaliland’s recognition quest is central because it challenges the core norm of Somali unity
Somaliland argues that it voluntarily united with Somalia in 1960 and has the right to withdraw that union, pointing to its separate colonial history, internal stability, and democratic credentials since 1991. Recognition would validate its de facto separation but would also set a precedent touching sensitive borders and autonomy issues across the Horn of Africa. For Mogadishu and many regional actors, affirming Somaliland’s statehood risks undermining the vision of a re‑unified Somali Republic and re‑opening other secession or border debates.
Source: Somalia: Colonial Legacy – CJA CJA – Center for Justice & Accountability
Keywords: Somaliland, international recognition, statehood, secession, Horn of Africa
15. Ethiopia remains a pivotal security actor, and its Somaliland MoU adds a new flashpoint
Ethiopia has long intervened in Somalia—to counter Islamist movements, secure its borderlands, and shape regional security balances—and remains a key military and diplomatic player. Its recent Memorandum of Understanding with Somaliland, reportedly involving port access and potential recognition signals, has been read in Mogadishu as a direct challenge to Somali sovereignty. This move risks heightening tensions between Ethiopia and the FGS, encouraging regional polarization, and potentially internationalizing the question of Somaliland’s status even further.
Source: Somalia’s Fractured Legacy: False Prophets and Failed Revolutions – Horn Review hornreview.org
Keywords: Ethiopia, Somaliland MoU, regional security, intervention, sovereignty
16. Turkey leveraged aid, infrastructure, and military training to become a core external partner
Turkey has invested heavily in Mogadishu’s airport, port facilities, hospitals, and public buildings, branding itself as a long‑term development partner rather than a short‑term intervener. Through the TURKSOM base and training programs, it has become one of the primary external supporters of the Somali National Army, providing equipment, doctrine, and elite unit training. This mix of soft power and security cooperation gives Ankara significant influence over Somalia’s future force structure and political leadership.
Source: Somalia – Civil war, conflict, famine | Britannica Britannica
Keywords: Turkey, TURKSOM, military training, infrastructure, strategic partnership
17. UAE and Qatar project their Gulf rivalry into Somali ports, politics, and security
The UAE has prioritized port concessions, security cooperation, and ties with certain Federal Member States, using economic and military tools to secure maritime influence in the Red Sea–Gulf of Aden corridor. Qatar has tended to back factions closer to political Islam and to the Mogadishu leadership, using financial and political support to counter Emirati and Saudi influence. Somalia thus becomes a contested arena where Gulf rivalries play out through competing investments, alliances, and media narratives, complicating internal reconciliation.
Source: Somalia’s Fractured Legacy: False Prophets and Failed Revolutions – Horn Review hornreview.org
Keywords: UAE, Qatar, proxy rivalry, ports, Federal Member States, Gulf politics
18. “Ma’awisley” militias turned localized self‑defence into a crucial anti‑Al‑Shabaab lever
Ma’awisley are community‑based militias, especially in central Somalia, that emerged as rural clans armed themselves against Al‑Shabaab taxation and intimidation. Their mobilization, sometimes with support or toleration from the FGS and regional authorities, has helped dislodge Al‑Shabaab from parts of the countryside where national forces were thin. However, their rise also raises long‑term questions about command‑and‑control, accountability, and how to demobilize or integrate them without creating new armed fiefdoms.
Source: Somalia – Civil war, conflict, famine | Britannica Britannica
Keywords: Ma’awisley, local militias, community defence, Al‑Shabaab, rural security
19. Clan elders remain the core moral and judicial reference where the state is weakest
In many areas, xeer (customary law) mediated by elders continues to handle disputes over land, marriage, blood compensation, and local peace settlements more effectively than distant formal courts. CJA – Center for Justice & Accountability Elders also play key roles in selecting MPs, mediating between armed actors, and legitimizing or rejecting local authorities in both federal and non‑federal areas. Their authority can both stabilize communities and entrench patriarchal or exclusionary norms, but practically they remain indispensable in the absence—or mistrust—of formal state institutions.
Source: Somalia: Colonial Legacy – CJA CJA – Center for Justice & Accountability
Keywords: clan elders, xeer, customary law, mediation, legitimacy
20. The diaspora finances war and peace, armed factions and state-building alike
Remittances from Somalis abroad are a lifeline for households and local economies, but some funds have also flowed to militias, political campaigns, and hardline religious actors. At the same time, many senior politicians, technocrats, and business leaders are returnees who bring skills, capital, and international networks into federal and regional administrations. The diaspora’s impact is thus dual: it sustains social resilience and reconstruction while also enabling certain actors to sustain conflict or pursue zero‑sum political projects.
Source: Somalia – Civil war, conflict, famine | Britannica Britannica
Keywords: Somali diaspora, remittances, militias, state‑building, investment, transnational networks
III. Future scenarios and current challenges
21. Moving to “one-person, one-vote” could deepen legitimacy but also inflame unresolved cleavages
A genuine popular vote could strengthen the social contract, weaken purely elite bargains, and give younger and urban populations more voice than the current indirect, clan‑mediated system. Yet without strong institutions, updated census data, and consensus on constituency boundaries, elections risk becoming flashpoints for violence, accusations of rigging, and center–periphery tensions. The outcome will hinge on whether electoral reform is sequenced with security improvements and inclusive political agreements rather than imposed unilaterally.
Source: Somalia – Civil war, conflict, famine | Britannica Britannica
Keywords: one‑person one‑vote, electoral reform, legitimacy, indirect elections, clan quotas
22. The ATMIS–AUSSOM transition will test whether Somali forces can truly hold recaptured territory
Replacing or reconfiguring ATMIS with a more Somali‑centered AUSSOM mission is intended to shift from foreign-led stabilization to Somali ownership of security. If Somali forces, police, and administrations are not ready, a premature drawdown could see Al‑Shabaab reoccupy former AMISOM/ATMIS areas, undermining popular faith in the state. A carefully staged transition, tied to local governance and revenue generation, is essential to avoid repeating earlier cycles of “liberate and lose” towns.
Source: Somalia – Civil war, conflict, famine | Britannica Britannica
Keywords: ATMIS, AUSSOM, transition, stabilization, Somali security forces
23. The Somali National Army can become national only if recruitment, command, and logistics break clan capture
So long as units are recruited, stationed, and commanded largely along clan lines, the SNA will behave more as a coalition of militias wearing national uniforms than as a neutral state force. Building a truly national army requires merit‑based promotions, integrated training (including via partners like Turkey), and dependable, transparent salary systems so loyalty attaches to the state, not to local financiers or commanders. Britannica Failure to do this will entrench fragmentation and make every security reform hostage to elite bargains among clan‑based power centers.
Source: Somalia – Civil war, conflict, famine | Britannica Britannica
Keywords: Somali National Army, clan militias, integration, security sector reform, command and control
24. Constitutional reform will define who controls territory, money, and guns for decades
Ongoing debates over the provisional constitution center on division of powers between the FGS and Federal Member States, resource and revenue sharing, and the structure of the executive and legislature. If reform clarifies competencies, ensures predictable transfers, and embeds arbitration mechanisms, it could significantly reduce zero‑sum struggles over Mogadishu. Ambiguous or imposed arrangements, by contrast, would likely fuel new confrontations and give armed actors incentives to hold or seize territory rather than negotiate.
Source: Somalia’s Fractured Legacy: False Prophets and Failed Revolutions – Horn Review hornreview.org
Keywords: constitutional reform, federalism, resource sharing, executive power, institutions
25. Climate change will drive displacement and give extremists more grievances to weaponize
More frequent droughts and floods will devastate pastoral and agro‑pastoral livelihoods, pushing communities into displacement, urban slums, or contested rural areas. Extremist groups can exploit this by offering food, credit, or “protection” in exchange for recruitment, taxation, or passive support, framing the state and international community as indifferent to suffering. Without climate‑sensitive development and local conflict resolution, environmental shocks will increasingly translate into both humanitarian crises and security risks.
Source: Somalia: Colonial Legacy – CJA CJA – Center for Justice & Accountability
Keywords: climate change, drought, displacement, recruitment, extremism, environmental security
26. A consensual FGS–Puntland settlement would prioritize negotiated rules over ad hoc deals
Such an approach would involve agreed mechanisms on resource sharing (especially ports and hydrocarbons), security cooperation, and representation in national institutions, reached through structured dialogue rather than episodic confrontations. Including Puntland’s leadership in core national decision‑making on elections and constitutional reform would signal that dissenting Federal Member States are partners, not subordinates. This is achievable by 2026 only if both sides treat compromise as politically valuable domestically, rather than a sign of weakness to their own constituencies.
Source: Somalia – Civil war, conflict, famine | Britannica Britannica
Keywords: Puntland, Federal Government, reconciliation, power‑sharing, negotiations
27. A negotiated settlement with Al‑Shabaab is possible in principle but constrained by ideology and regional politics
In theory, protracted insurgencies often end with some form of talks, and local deals already exist in parts of Somalia over taxation, movement, or dispute resolution. However, Al‑Shabaab’s global jihadist alignment, rigid ideology, and designation as a terrorist organization by key international partners make formal negotiations politically and legally difficult. Any future settlement would likely need to combine military pressure, amnesty or reintegration for some members, and quiet contacts rather than a single grand bargain.
Source: Somalia – Civil war, conflict, famine | Britannica Britannica
Keywords: negotiated settlement, Al‑Shabaab, peace talks, counterterrorism, political dialogue
28. Offshore oil and gas could either cement federalism or ignite new center–periphery conflicts
If significant reserves are developed, transparent and predictable revenue‑sharing formulas between federal and state levels—and across generations—could provide resources for infrastructure, security, and social services, strengthening incentives for unity. Conversely, ambiguous ownership of offshore blocks and opaque contracts could fuel disputes between Mogadishu and coastal Federal Member States, and among clans claiming rights to coastal zones. The pre‑production phase is therefore the critical window to agree on legal frameworks before high‑stakes rents materialize.
Source: Somalia’s Fractured Legacy: False Prophets and Failed Revolutions – Horn Review hornreview.org
Keywords: offshore oil, gas, resource federalism, revenue sharing, hydrocarbons
29. EAC membership could anchor Somalia in a larger economic and security community if absorption is managed carefully
Joining the East African Community offers access to a wider common market, potential infrastructure integration, and frameworks for security cooperation with neighbors. But disparities in security, regulatory capacity, and infrastructure mean Somalia risks being a weaker partner unless domestic reforms advance in parallel. If managed well, EAC integration could reduce isolation and create economic incentives for stability; if mismanaged, it could deepen perceptions of external dependency and unequal competition.
Source: Somalia – Civil war, conflict, famine | Britannica Britannica
Keywords: East African Community, regional integration, trade, security cooperation, membership
30. Best-case 2030 is a minimally functional federal state, threatened by three main spoilers
A plausible best‑case by 2030 is a Somalia with imperfect but regular elections, a more integrated security sector, functioning federal–state revenue sharing, and Al‑Shabaab contained to residual pockets rather than contesting major cities. The three most serious spoilers are: (1) a botched ATMIS/AUSSOM transition that hands territory back to Al‑Shabaab; (2) elite breakdown over constitutional reform and resource sharing, leading to renewed inter‑federal conflict; and (3) escalating external rivalries (Ethiopia–Somalia, Gulf competition) that instrumentalize local actors. How Somali and regional leaders handle the next 3–5 years on these fronts will largely determine whether that best‑case remains reachable.
Source: Somalia – Civil war, conflict, famine | Britannica Britannica
Keywords: 2030 scenario, spoilers, federal state, ATMIS transition, external rivalry, governance
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